一、报告题目：

Price Competition in Multi-Sided Markets

二、报告人：

Junjie Zhou, National University of Singapore

三、报告时间：

2019年7月16日 （周二） 下午 3:00-4:30

四、报告地点：

知新楼B423

五、报告人简介：

Junjie Zhou is currently an assistant professor of economics at NUS. He received his PhD degree in Mathematics from UC Berkeley in 2012 and bachelor’s degree of Mathematics from University of Science and Technology of China in 2007. His current research focuses on social and economic network, industrial organization and game theory. His research work has been published in Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, the Economic Journal, Games and Economic Behavior, the Rand Journal of Economics, Operations Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management and Production and Operations Management.

六、 报告摘要：

 This paper studies a general model of price competition among platforms offering differentiated services in multi-sided markets. We incorporate a general form of both within-side and cross-side externalities into a discrete choice model of random utility maximization by consumers on each side of the markets. We consider a two-stage game in which the platforms choose prices (or user fees) simultaneously in the first stage, followed by consumers on all sides simultaneously deciding which platform to join (single-homing) in the second stage. We show that in a symmetric setting with full market coverage, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in prices and the equilibrium price on each side follows a simple rule: The price equals the cost, plus a mark-up due to product differentiation, minus a subsidy due to cross-side externalities. The subsidy to each side accounts for the degree of the aggregate marginal externalities of that side imposed on all the other sides. As competition among platforms increases, both the product differentiation effect and the cross-subsidy are shown to decrease. As such, the price on one side can decrease while the price on another side may increase with the number of platforms. We also discuss the incentives for platforms to merge and the extent of excessive free entry of platforms into the markets as compared to the social optimum. We further compare uniform pricing rule with discriminatory pricing across different sides of the markets and find that the average price across sides under the discriminatory pricing is higher than the uniform price when the externalities are small or when the number of platforms is large. The impacts of consumers' outside options on the equilibrium prices are also studied. (Jointly with Guofu Tan, University of Southern California - Department of Economics)

七、主办单位：

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